This paper examines what happened to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) monetary and nonmonetary compensation at Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 firms in the years surrounding the 2008 financial crisis and in the context of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) legislation. We use novel data on...

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the impact of public scrutiny on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms. Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis and, in particular, government...

Hedge funds are more likely to target firms with high levels of institutional ownership and demonstrate a preference for short-term focused institutional investors. Hedge fund activism generates short run and long run abnormal returns without increasing stock return volatility. Regardless of...

This paper is the first to evaluate the effectiveness of youth financial literacy education programs in an environment of a government mandate to embed financial literacy education across the curriculum in grades four to twelve. It presents results from a unique data set of survey and focus...

This paper examines the impact of public scrutiny on CEO compensation using the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis, government support, and legislated compensation restrictions. I introduce novel data on executive perks at S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2012. Overall, my...

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of executive perks at S&P 500 firms using manually collected panel data. CEOs receive perks more frequently and at higher levels than other named executive officers (NEOs). In general, S&P 500 firms with larger growth...

This paper examines the relationship between hedge fund activism and target firm performance, executive compensation, and executive wealth. It introduces a theoretical framework that describes the activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions. The methodology uses regression analysis on a...

This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...