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Moral hazard, mergers, and market power
Wickelgren, Abraham L. - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001591361
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The Principal's Moral Hazard : Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy
Miller, Gary J.; Whitford, Andrew B. - 2015
Pure incentive schemes rely on agent self-interest, rather than more coercive control, to motivate subordinates. Yet most organizations, and in particular public agencies, rely very little on pure incentive contracts. Most organizations rely on the primarily coercive mechanisms of monitoring and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027255
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Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device
Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626
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Multi-tier hierarchies : a moral hazard approach
Coleff, Joaquin; Sebastián Ivars, Juan Sebastián - 2024
We consider an organization with two projects which have productive spillovers. Three agents are active in this organization: two agents, each specialized in one project, and the CEO, who is a generalist. The organization owner first allocates authority over each project to these three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537139
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Delegation and Incentive Compensation
Nagar, Venky - 2001
-agent theory, I find that the extent of incentive compensation does not play a significant role in explaining the extent of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034777
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Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations : The 'Insurance/Incentive Trade-Off'
Whitford, Andrew B. - 2005
inefficient risk-sharing. These experimental outcomes, while anomalous from the standpoint of principal-agency theory, are quite … may allow an outcome preferred, by both principal and agent, to that deemed possible by principal-agency theory. If this … is true, then the lessons to be learned from principal-agency theory are all the wrong ones. Concentrating on incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027929
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Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies
Jovanovic, Dragan - 2013
, efficiency gains resulting from managerial effort are not merger specific, i.e., they may be realized by all firms before and … after a merger. We show that synergies suppress managerial incentives within the non-merging firms, whereas the effect on … the merged firm critically depends on the number of agents employed by its principal. An important implication for merger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009725257
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Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies
Jovanovic, Dragan - 2014 - [rev.]
actually reduce consumer surplus which opposes the use of an efficiency defense in merger control. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360044
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Backwards integration and strategic delegation
Hunold, Matthias; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stahl, Konrad - 2012
We analyze the effects of downstream firms’ acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when all firms compete in prices. With an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals’ sales. Double marginalization is enhanced....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009512802
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Backwards Integration and Strategic Delegation
Hunold, Matthias; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stahl, Konrad O. - 2012
We analyze the effects of downstream firms’ acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when all firms compete in prices. With an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals’ sales. Double marginalization is enhanced....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171488