Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Das Papier befasst sich modelltheoretisch mit dem empirischen Phänomen des „Demokratischen Friedens“, der Beobachtung also, dass Demokratien ihre Konflikte in der Regel nicht kriegerisch lösen. Die Grundlage meiner Analyse bildet das Modell von Fearon (1995), ein Verhandlungsspiel mit 2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225096
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292375
The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327833
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711293
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434511
The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I fi nd that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723149
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160801
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617553