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A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping

Harrington, Joseph Emmett (contributor) - 1999 - [Elektronische Ressource], rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001511885

Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues

Harrington, Joseph Emmett (contributor) - 1998 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001513036

Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Economics of governance 1 (2000) 1, pp. 13-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001459599

There may be no pass through of a merger-related cost efficiency

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Economics letters 208 (2021), pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013207048

Developing competition law for collusion by autonomous artificial agents

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Journal of competition law & economics 14 (2018) 3, pp. 331-363

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002589

The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Economics letters 160 (2017), pp. 78-81

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011903760

A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 71 (2017) 1, pp. 140-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746833

The effect of outsourcing pricing algorithms on market competition

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 9, pp. 6889-6906

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013373132

The anticompetitiveness of a private information exchange of prices

Harrington, Joseph Emmett - In: International journal of industrial organization 85 (2022), pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013483768

Optimal corporate leniency programs

Harrington, Joseph E. - 2005

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293443

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