This Discussion paper has been substantially revised, and is now available under the title "Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?" in Experimental Economics, June 2016, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 382–393; http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10683-015-9444-1 We set out to test...

An informed advisor may have incentives to send a biased advice to an uninformed decisionmaker. We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. A key feature of our experiment is that we measure how advisors expect decisionmakers...

We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. We measure how advisors expect decisionmakers to react to their advice in order to distinguish between strategic and moral reactions to disclosure by advisors. Results indicate that...

We study an experimental market in which the structure of the information flows is endogenized. When making an offer, traders choose not only the price at which they are prepared to trade, but also the subset of traders they want to inform about the offer. This design allows for two extreme...