Among the factors that give rise to corruption, it is suggested that three groups be distinguished: fundamental factors rooted in the imperfection of economic institutions and economic policy, organizational factors ("weakness of the government"), and societal factors that depend on the...

Implementation of Pigovian taxation relies on the presumption that individuals follow self-interested Nash equilibrium predictions of behavior when making decisions. Experimental evidence indicates that, while Nash predictions perform quite well in impersonal exchange, in other environments,...

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

This article contends that a new research avenue is open to comparative economics which is the economic comparison between American (closed) and European (open) professional team sports leagues. It starts with sketching the major institutional differences between the two leagues systems. Then it...

We propose a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth. Our approach can be employed either when a network owner wishes to sell bandwidth for a specified period of time to a number of different users, or when users cooperate to build a...

While every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk (the cost of insufficient supply), some firms may, even with wholesale price contracts, completely avoid inventory risk (the cost of unsold inventory). With a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer, by ordering his...

The paper considers the strategic interaction between network and generating companies at electricity transmission market within the simplest electric power system with two nodes. The four possible variants of the market organization are investigated: guaranteed regulated and non-regulated...