Similar Search Results

Otto, Clemens A. - 2014

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070717

Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

Stark, Johanna - 2020

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330

Value-Risk Tradeoffs and Managerial Incentives

Tsui, David - 2018

managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk … aversion creates potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with … idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk and managers are more risk-averse. Collectively, these results suggest that firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936802

Managerial Incentives Explanation of Equity Carve-Outs Initial Returns

Seistrajkova, Biljana - 2017

This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970504

Optimal Executive Compensation : Stock Options or Restricted Stocks

Wu, Yan Wendy - 2020

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857493

The Presence, Value, and Incentive Properties of Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation Contracts

Bettis, J. Carr - 2014

Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059189

Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion and Corporate Policy Decisions

McKnight, Scott - 2016

corporate policy, the firm's optimal policy also influences the compensation contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994292

Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives

Lee, Jongsub - 2018

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932017

Do Risk-Taking Incentives Induce CEOs to Invest? Evidence from Acquisitions

Croci, Ettore - 2015

approximately 4.22% enhancement in acquisition investments, consistent with the theory that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035571

Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives

Litov, Lubomir P.; Liu, Xia (Summer); Megginson, William L. - 2021

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at publicly listed firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211007