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Prehire screening and subjective performance evaluations

Chen, Bin R.; Li, Sanxi - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 64 (2018) 10, pp. 4953-4965

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932660

Experimentation and project selection : screening and learning

Gomes, Renato; Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Games and economic behavior 96 (2016), pp. 145-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742204

A screening perspective on experimental zones

Cheng, Chen; Xing, Yiqing - In: China economic review : an international journal 77 (2023), pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014233682

The provision of high-powered incentives under multitasking

Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014293034

Optimal procurement contracts with pre-project planning

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2010

The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis : The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891764

Public Contracting for Private Innovation : Government Expertise, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes

Bruce, Joshua R. - 2018

We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917011

Foundations for Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement

Garrett, Daniel Ferguson - 2012

We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme --- a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract --- minimizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712337

A Versatile Prism : Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model

Yukins, Christopher R. - 2011

efforts at reform. At no point, however, have we ever had an overarching theory - a model or prism - through which to assess … the procurement system or its reform. Agency theory provides one such theoretical model. Long established in economics and … the other social sciences, the principal-agent model (agency theory) provides a model to explain successes (and failures …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043915

Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance

Kaal, Wulf A. - 2019

As a foundational technology, blockchain technology creates the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance that, over time, creates the environment that enables the removal of internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012872168