This paper builds on Riordan and Williamson (1985) by exploring the economizing choice of organizational form by firms competing in a homogeneous-good market. The paper investigates rivalrous firms' investment and organization choice in a Cournot competition. The model suggests that both...

One of the most important developments in theories of American bureaucracy has been the claim that organizational procedures enacted by public officials have a significant impact on the nature of both bureaucratic control and performance. This development has been accompanied, however, by...

We draw on the positive political theory and campaign finance literatures to examine how interest groups allocate influence activities (e.g., monetary donations, lobbying) across multiple government institutions when seeking more favorable agency policy decisions. By modeling agency behavior in...

By analyzing the interaction between a business firm and multiple government institutions (including a regulatory agency, an executive and a bicameral legislature), we develop predictions about how firms target their political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more...

State Supreme Courts have grown in importance during the last thirty years in the formation of public policy. Their judgements determine many aspects of constitutional law, tort reform, judicial selection, and campaign finance reform, among others. A vast body of literature has been developed...