period, even if no informative communication can be sustained in the stage game. We conclude that repeated interaction can … overcome strategic limits of communication …

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …

identical for both sender and receiver. Additionally, the sender incurs a communication cost which is increasing in the … applied to the case where communication is costless but preferences diverge. Additionally, we model the competency of the … decreasing in the likelihood of the mistake. When the preferences between players diverge and when there are communication costs …

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …

-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases … trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusion of verbal communication generates both …

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived … by means of communication. When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication mechanisms … or protocols exist that sustain the same set of equilibrium payoffs as in the standard repeated game. When communication …

This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can …-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modification results in … truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is …

We consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma model with a pre-play communication stage. Players get a disutility from deceiving …