Estimations of the shadow economies for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over 1999 to 2003 are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of "official" GDP) in 2002/03 in 96 developing countries is 38.7%, in 28 transition...

Estimations of the shadow economies for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over 1999 to 2005 are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of "official" GDP) in 2004/05 in 96 developing countries is 36.7%, in 25 transition...

This paper analyses the determinants of the size of the informal economy using crosscountry regressions. Two sets of global data using indirect estimation techniques and the perception of business leaders for 109 countries as well as a regional set for Latin America based on direct data are used...

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of thin-capitalization rules in preventing debt finance by intercompany loans and explores their consequences for corporate decisions. A theoretical discussion emphasizes that limitations of the deduction of interest owed to foreign affiliates would not only...

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to...

The paper analyzes under which conditions a partial tax cooperation will be welfare enhancing within the cooperating regions. Starting from the standard symmetric tax competition model, subgroups of regions can form tax cooperations and thereby increase their relevant market share. As the...

Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax...

Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall...

In dem Beitrag werden die Entstehungshintergründe, Ziele und Interessen des Bundes der Steuerzahler (BdSt) erläutert. Anhand von Beispielen werden die Formen der Beteiligung des Verbandes am politischen Willensbildungsprozess verdeutlicht. Steuerzahler, die grundsätzlich bereit sind, ehrlich...

Auditing institutions, such as the German Federal Court of Audit (BRH), provide information on public revenue and public spending. The question of how to increase tax compliance has been of frequent interest. Unfortunately, information from German taxpayers? declaration behaviour (beyond the...