I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium—and consistent with data—the...

I study how a matching platform's design affects users' welfare and probability of matching (outcomes) and the strategic decisions behind such a design. I consider a two-sided matching model in which each agent has a limited number of prospects. An increase in agents' number of prospects has two...

I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium—and consistent with data—the...

I study a real-options model where the investor computes the value of a project (VOP) from available data. In the process, she makes mistakes, as she suffers from over-confidence and inference biases. I study how the optimal investment rule and timing depend on investors' biases. I show that the...

I study the relationship between a matching platform's design and users' welfare. Increasing users' number of prospects has a positive choice effect (users are more likely to find a desirable partner) and a negative competition effect (users are less likely to match). The interaction of choice...