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Englmaier, Florian; Gebhardt, Georg - 2010

We run a public good experiment in the field and in the lab with (partly) the same subjects. The field experiment is a … true natural field experiment as subjects do not know that they are exposed to an experimental variation. We can show that … subjects' behavior in the classic lab public good experiment correlates with their behavior in the structurally comparable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823173

Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism in the VCM : an experimental investigation

Xu, Bin; Cadsby, Bram; Fan, Liangcong; Song, Fei - 2011 - Rev.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500885

A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production

Guillén, Pablo; Merrett, Danielle; Slonim, Robert - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 61 (2015) 7, pp. 1514-1530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304127

Punishment justifiable as a quasi-tax

Gilboa, David - In: Economics & philosophy 31 (2015) 3, pp. 431-445

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348382

Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism : an experimental investigation

Xu, Bin; Cadsby, Charles Bram; Fan, Liangcong; Song, Fei - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 89-105

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754878

Informative voting and the Samuelson rule

Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006

We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864

Why people obey the law : experimental evidence from the provision of public goods

Feld, Lars P.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2002

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408944

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games

Lim, Wooyoung; Zhang, Jipeng - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 20 (2020) 2, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306561

Monopolistic group design with peer effects

Board, Simon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 89-125

In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699153