) estimate around CEO turnover events. Our seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results show that while hedged managers engage … the unhedged managers. Our results are stronger in years with high volatility index (VIX) and are robust to controlling …

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

time. These effects occur when participants – i.e., managers and firms – have rational expectations and develop forecasts …

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When … managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects … and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no …

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When … managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects … and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no …

, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …