We investigate competition between experts with different motives. A policy-maker has to implement a policy and can either acquire information herself or hire a biased but well-informed expert. We show that the expert charges a fee if interests between the agents are roughly aligned, and pays...

I examine a cheap talk game with two decisions, two payoff-relevant states, and two senders. The model features interdependence because information about each state affects both decisions. Senders are imperfectly informed and communication depends on the nature of their information. I first...

I study the relationship between a firm's organization and its ability to aggregate information under interdependence. The firm must adapt the design of two products to innovations over two attributes, such that information about each attribute affects the design of both products. Agents have...

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modelled...

We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions about some common issue by taking weighted averages of neighbors'...