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A Second-Best Mechanism for Land Assembly

Grossman, Zachary; Pincus, Jonathan; Shapiro, Perry - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2010

frustrated by holdout landowners. The existing land-assembly institution of eminent domain can be used neither to gauge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678024

Experimental analysis of a land assembly mechanism

Chaturvedi, Rakesh; Kanjilal, Kiriti - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 91 (2021), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643420

Land assembly with taxes, not takings

DeSantis, Mark; McCarter, Matthew W.; Winn, Abel M. - In: Applied economics letters 26 (2019) 7, pp. 604-607

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012204283

Second-best mechanisms for land assembly and hold-out problems

Grossman, Zachary; Pincus, Jonathan James; Shapiro, Perry; … - In: Journal of public economics 175 (2019), pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160545

Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing

Deb, Rajat; Seo, Tae - In: International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 1, pp. 223-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008594147

Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection

Jamison, Julian C. - 2012

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343339