Discussion of the paper “Rivalry between Shareholder Value and Large Size in the Global Economy” by Manfred Neumann. (see also: 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326116' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326116)In his paper, Manfred Neumann deals with an important question: “If the firms' owners can...

In this paper we study the conditions under which socially responsible firms can develop a first-mover advantage. We consider a price-setting duopoly market with vertically and horizontally differentiated products, where firms can engage in socially responsible activities and thereby increase...

The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of...

A robust result in the literature on strategic incentives pioneered by Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) is that under quantity competition firm owners induce their managers to make aggressive quantity choices in the product market. We revisit this result in a...

In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It...

According to the classical result on complementary monopolies, a single-product firm unambiguously prefers purchasing complementary inputs from an integrated monopolistic supplier rather than from different non-integrated monopolistic suppliers. In this note, we account for the fact that firms...

We employ a dynamic market model with endogenous creation of submarkets to study the optimal product innovation strategies of incumbent firms. Firms invest in production capacity and R&D knowledge stock, where the latter determines the hazard rate of innovation. We find that under Markov Perfect...

This paper analyzes how the transferability of production capacities from an established to a new product influences the incentives of a firm to invest in R&D. A dynamic duopoly model is considered, where initially both firms offer a homogeneous product. The firms invest in production capacities...

Firms commonly manufacture multiple products using multiple complementary inputs. The multi-input-multi-product environment generates interactions among products yielding the following results for the firm's sourcing strategies: (i) A multi-input-multi-product firm might optimally deviate from...

In this paper we study the long run evolution of a mixed oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. We consider an evolutionary setting based on payoff-monotone selection dynamics with N-firm matching which captures the endogenous...