We examine the effect of learning of uninformed traders in a dynamic limit order market with asymmetric and short-lived information. We show that the learning is effective and valuable with respect to information acquisition, forecasting and buy-sell decision accuracies, and profit opportunity...

In reality, the organizational structure of information — describing how information is transmitted to its recipients — is as important as its content. In this paper, we introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture...

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

This paper studies the social value of public information in environments without common knowledge of the data-generating process. We show that the stronger the coordination motive behind agents' behaviour is, the more they use private or public signals in the way that they suspect others are...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards affects investment efficiency. The model entails a CEO who encounters an investment project and decides either or not to present it for approval to a board of directors. The CEO may need to collect and report investment-relevant...

Information about the future may be instrumentally useful, yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate due to anticipatory feelings. We show that...

On financial markets, information is a highly demanded resource and processing it to (potentially) generate excess returns drives the activities of many market participants. Not surprisingly, this high relevance of information in markets culminates in a high research interest focusing on how...

This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive initial private information and select an action out of a choice set under uncertainty in each of infinitely many periods, observing the history of choices of their neighbors....

We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to...

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product seller, which learns about the consumer's preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from accurate product recommendations, the seller...