We analyze a limited liability credit market where the borrowers need to borrow to implement their chosen projects with …

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision … on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to "monitor each other" by …

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when … acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability … return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived. -- managers ; risky decisions ; limited liability …

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when … acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability …