This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two papers address political economy and industrial organization aspects of agricultural policy, and the last two international aspects of environmental policy. Paper [1] explains Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers...

We study how beliefs affect individuals' willingness to undertake prevention expenditure through a two-type, N-person public good game and test several results empirically. We show analytically that pessimistic agents will invest more in prevention expenditure than optimists. We should how...

We determine the exact upper bound of the inefficiency of atomic splittable selfish traffic equilibria with elastic travel demand with and without road pricing. In the previous results, only pseudo-approximation bound were obtained for this case. By comparison, we also conclude that the traffic...

This paper concerns the welfare consequences of environmental policy cooperation in a two-country economy. We assume that the countries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that they differ with respect to competition in the labor market. The purpose is to...

In this paper, we consider the welfare effects of environmental policy cooperation in a two-country economy. We assume that the countries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that the countries differ with respect to competition in the labor market. The purpose is...

This paper investigates the effects of climate-induced rising of ocean temperature on the optimal fishing policies in a two players? non-cooperative game setting. We compare reactive management, under which the manager does not believe in or know about temperature trend, with proactive...

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...