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Influencing Policy and Transforming Institutions : Lessons from Kidney/Liver Exchange

Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Kidney exchange emerges as a pioneering application in the early stages of market design. In contrast to most other successful applications in the field, where design economists primarily serve as consultants to decision-makers, in the context of kidney exchange, they assumed the role of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014447262

On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking

Han, Xiang - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 218 (2024), pp. 1-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015070826

Improving Schools Through School Choice : A Market Design Approach

Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Narita, Yusuke - 2016

We study the effect of different centralized public school choice mechanisms on schools’ incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174140

Manipulability in School Choice

Decerf, Benoit; Linden, Martin van der - 2020

We compare the manipulability of school choice mechanisms based on the occurrence of dominant strategies. We characterize dominant strategies in the constrained versions of the deferred acceptance (DA) and Boston (BOS) mechanisms. We leverage our characterizations to show that dominant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126337

Assignment Games with Externalities And Matching-Based Cournot Competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332666

Matching with Externalities

Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2021

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220503

The Strong Effects of Weak Externalities on School Choice

Duque, Eduardo; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo - 2022

-proof: the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism. We show that this property is not satisfied when externalities are … externalities). Indeed, although weak externalities have no effects on stability, there are school choice contexts in which no … schools' priorities are Ergin-acyclic. This strong effect of weak externalities on incentives is related to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235563

Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice

Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1261-1304

complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419616

Optimal dynamic matching

Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1221-1278

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309588

Optimal dynamic matching

Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1221-1278

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189037