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Censorship as optimal persuasion
Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Timofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 561-585
our results to the problem of media censorship by a government. … upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273762
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Chapter 14. Media Bias in the Marketplace : Theory
Gentzkow, Matthew; Shapiro, Jesse M.; Stone, Daniel F. - 2015
We review the theoretical literature on market determinants of media bias. We present a theoretical framework that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025202
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A Theory of Media Bias and Disinformation
Foerster, Manuel - 2022
We build a model of media bias in which consumers with heterogeneous beliefs do not know whether the media firm (i) is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295069
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Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?
Innocenti, Federico - 2022
news sources and the proliferation of misinformation. I show that media pluralism reduces information quality when news …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242957
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Role of media in curbing corruption: the case of Uganda under President Yoweri K. Museveni during the “no-party” system
Nogara, Monica - Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations - 2009
Free, independent and hard-hitting media can play an important role in curbing corruption. Media in Uganda has enjoyed … considerable freedom in this regard since Museveni came to power in 1986. The evolving power structure and a changing media … landscape, however, have presented both challenges and opportunities for media’s watchdog role on corruption. This paper will …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786831
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Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010038
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Persuading an audience: Testing information design in the laboratory
Ziegler, Andreas - 2023
Governments, central banks, and private organizations frequently face the challenge of convincing their audience to take a specific action. One key choice is whether to send a public message that can coordinate the audience's actions or to rely instead on private messages that may differ across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469659
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Persuasion by dimension reduction
Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529
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Optimal transport of information
Malamud, Semyon; Cieślak, Anna; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: March 3, 2021
We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719
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Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach
Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702