A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets
Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1 (i) bargaining set and the M1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1 (im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1 (i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences between the theories.
Year of publication: |
1979
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Authors: | Michener, H. Andrew ; Sakurai, Melvin M. ; Yuen, Kenneth ; Kasen, Thomas J. |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 23.1979, 1, p. 102-119
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Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Saved in:
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