A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games
This article reports an experimental test of the M1 (im) Cooperative and M1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M1 (im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M1 (im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the core and in games in which the strength of the 13 coalition is high. These findings are consistent with the view that variations in game properties may affect the salience of different standards of fairness that underlie the M1 (im) bargaining set.
Year of publication: |
1983
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Authors: | Michener, H. Andrew ; Yuen, Kenneth |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 27.1983, 1, p. 109-135
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Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Saved in:
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