A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment

The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Forges, Françoise
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 78.2013, C, p. 64-71
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Bayesian game \| Commitment \| Contract \| Incentive compatibility \| Interim individual rationality

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608396