A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marlats, Chantal |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 58.2015, 3, p. 485-507
|
Subject: | Folk theorem | Stochastic games | Cooperation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Folk-Theorem |
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