A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Ledyard, John O. ; Palfrey, Thomas R. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 133.2007, 1, p. 441-466
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Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Theorie | Theory |
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