A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Ke, Rongzhu ; Ryan, Christopher Thomas |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 13.2018, 3, p. 1425-1481
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Principal agent | moral hazard | solution method |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2167 [DOI] 1041397534 [GVK] hdl:10419/197180 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:2167 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
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