Incentive design for operations-marketing multitasking
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Dai, Tinglong ; Ke, Rongzhu ; Ryan, Christopher Thomas |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 67.2021, 4, p. 2211-2230
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Subject: | marketing-operations interface | multitasking | moral hazard | retail operations | optimal control | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Einzelhandel | Retail trade | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives |
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