A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hatsumi, Kentaro ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 153-168
|
Subject: | Social choice | Mechanism design | Voting by committees | Generalized median voter scheme | Separable preference | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
-
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Martínez, Ricardo, (2013)
-
Level r consensus and stable social choice
Mahajne, Muhammad, (2014)
-
Level r consensus and stable social choice
Mahajne, Muhammad, (2015)
- More ...
-
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies of homogeneous indivisible objects
Hatsumi, Kentaro, (2007)
-
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies of homogeneous indivisible objects
Hatsumi, Kentaro, (2007)
-
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
Hatsumi, Kentaro, (2009)
- More ...