Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Hatsumi, Kentaro ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 33.2009, 3, p. 423-447
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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