A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.

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Year of publication:	2011-03
Authors:	Hatsumi, Kentaro ; Berga, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Institutions:	Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610696