A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model
Year of publication: |
March 2017
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Authors: | Mao, Liang ; Tianyu, Zhang |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 152.2017, p. 79-82
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Subject: | Strategic bargaining | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Normalized procedures | Minimal sufficient set | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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