Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Mao, Liang |
Published in: |
Resource and energy economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655, ZDB-ID 1153616-0. - Vol. 61.2020, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Coalition formation | International environmental agreement | Participation uncertainty | Stable coalition | Koalition | Coalition | Umweltabkommen | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty |
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