A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning With Testable Implications
Year of publication: |
2006-01
|
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Authors: | Pinkston, Joshua C. |
Institutions: | Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor |
Subject: | Asymmetric Employer Learning | Wage and Performance Relationship | Applications of Auction Theory |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 390 51 pages |
Classification: | J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D44 - Auctions |
Source: |
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