A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gómez-Rúa, María ; Vidal-Puga, Juan J. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 63.2017, 3, p. 813-826
|
Subject: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems | Cost sharing | Core Selection | Cost Monotonicity | Merge-proofness | Weighted Shapley value | Shapley-Wert | Shapley value | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Kosten | Costs | Selbstbeteiligung | Deductible |
-
Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for airport problems
Chun, Youngsub, (2008)
-
An improper solution to the flood cost sharing problem
Müller, David, (2024)
-
Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents
Trudeau, Christian, (2014)
- More ...
-
The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
Gómez-Rúa, María, (2010)
-
Merge-proofness in minimum cost spanning tree problems
Gómez-Rúa, María, (2011)
-
Gómez-Rúa, María, (2014)
- More ...