A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Amorós, Pablo |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 110.2011, 3, p. 241-244
|
Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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