A note on information revelation in procurement auctions

This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Doni, Nicola ; Menicucci, Domenico
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze
Subject:	Information Revelation \| Logconcavity \| Risk Aversion

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers - Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	13 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518894