Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with leviathan governments

Thomas Eichner; Rüdiger Pethig

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.'s model.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Eichner, Thomas ; Pethig, Rüdiger
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	global tax coordination \| repeated game \| sustainability \| stability \| Steuerwettbewerb \| Tax competition \| Steuerharmonisierung \| Tax harmonization \| Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik \| International economic policy \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Globalisierung \| Globalization \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Welt \| World \| Nachhaltige Entwicklung \| Sustainable development

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (6 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 4909
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/102189 [Handle]
Classification:	H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383847