A note on the equal-loss principle for bargaining problems
Some shortcomings of the equal-loss solution for bargaining problems are noticed: in general, it is not individually rational, and in case it is, then turns out a selection of the YU solutions. Finally, a new way of proving characterization results is provided.
Year of publication: |
1992-05
|
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Authors: | Blanco, Carmen Herrero ; Gil, María del Carmen Marco |
Institutions: | Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) |
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