A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Goerke, Laszlo
Publisher:	Konstanz : Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Subject:	Private Information \| Joint Bargaining \| Strike Activity

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Series:	Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; 357
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	733230660 [GVK] hdl:10419/101651 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:kondp2:357 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398076