A polynomial optimization approach to principal-agent problems
by Philipp Renner and Karl Schmedders
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Renner, Philipp ; Schmedders, Karl |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 83.2015, 2, p. 729-769
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| Subject: | Principal-agent model | moral hazard | polynomial optimization | firstorder approach | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350620