Monitoring "lemons" : why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely
Marcus Dittrich and Silvio Städter
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Dittrich, Marcus ; Städter, Silvio |
| Published in: |
Applied economics letters. - New York, NY : Routledge, ISSN 1466-4291, ZDB-ID 1484783-8. - Vol. 28.2021, 9, p. 737-741
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| Subject: | incentive contracts | moral hazard | Principal-agent model | workplace monitoring | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012501605