A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation

I analyze a probabilistic voting model where two office-motivated candidates choose an indirect taxation policy to maximize the probability of winning the election, in a society divided into a finite number of groups, whose members have different preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates must satisfy those groups whose political power is higher. In equilibrium the more powerful groups obtain lower tax rates on those goods they prefer more.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Canegrati, Emanuele
Published in:	FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. - ISSN 0015-2218. - Vol. 67.2011, 1, p. 27-45
Subject:	probabilistic voting theory \| indirect taxation \| public expenditure

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies ; H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024614