Potential Theft as an Indirect Tax

This theoretical model demonstrates that there is an excess burden from potential theft similar to that which results from an indirect tax with some positive probability of payment. In addition, the model shows that potential theft creates a bias for consumption to drift away from "steal-able" items to substitute items.

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Year of publication:	1973-01-27
Authors:	Cebula, Richard ; Gatons, Paul
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	risk aversion \| indirect taxation \| property crime

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Public Choice 1.20(1974): pp. 109-111
Classification:	D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109003