(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chernomaz, Kirill ; Goertz, Johanna |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 147.2023, p. 1-23
|
Subject: | Committees | Voting | Simple plurality rule | Condorcet jury theorem | Asymmetric equilibria | Agent-based simulations | Adaptive learning | Genetic algorithm | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Lernprozess | Learning process | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Simulation | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting |
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