A Trace of Anger is Enough : On the Enforcement of Social Norms

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Steiner, Jakub
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Soziale Norm \| Social norm \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Strafe \| Punishment \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Free rider problem \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Series:	CERGE-EI Working Paper No ; 246
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D64 - Altruism ; H41 - Public Goods ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061315