Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dye, Ronald A. ; Sridharan, Sri S. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 123.2014, 3, p. 308-312
|
Subject: | Optimal contracting | Moral hazard | Random private benefits | Depressed incentives | Increasing residual values | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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