Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 36.2005, 2, p. 318-336
|
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability |
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