Allocation by coercion

The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of robust stability lead to the existence of monarchs in all subsets of individuals, except possibly one.

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Year of publication:	2009-11-30
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Allocation rule \| dictator \| indivisible good \| power \| coalition formation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D85 - Network Formation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550067